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and visual examples from both East and 
West reveal a New Jerusalem meaning 
(G. Wolﬀ and A. Hoﬀmann, B. Baert), 
and the Benedictine and Franciscan tra-
ditions of translating sacred spaces in 
Western Europe were also discussed (L. 
Evseeva, M. Piccirillo). In varied sources 
of non-material culture New Jerusalem 
themes are revealed (M. Chkhartishvily, 
O. Belova & V. Petrukhin). In America, 
at the dawn of the modern age, this theme 
was present in painting (G. Carr), and a 
hierotopic meaning was also sought for in 
an unrealized mid-th-century renova-
tion project for the Church of the Holy 
Sepulchre (R. Ousterhout).
Among the scholars who went fur-
thest in their innovative interpretation 
was Alexei Lidov. Taking the well-known 
phenomenon of the Holy Fire miracu-
lously occurring on Christ’s tomb on 
Holy Saturdays as his starting-point, he 
interpreted some insuﬃciently elucidat-
ed phenomena such as „lanterns of the 
dead“, architectural structures occurring 
in medieval West-European cemeteries, 
as well as the lanterned domes introduced 
during the Renaissance, also explained by 
reference to the Resurrection Rotund in 
Jerusalem.   
The second largest group of partici-
pants to Russia was the one from Serbia 
with its ﬁve representatives whose papers 
attracted attention and inspired discus-
sion. Danica Popovic was given the hon-
our of not only a plenary paper (along 
with A. Lidov, R. Ousterhout, L. Belaev 
and G. Zelenskaya), but also of giving 
the concluding remarks along with her 
colleagues from the USA, Great Britain, 
Russia and Bulgaria. Given that the so-
called “Belgrade school” of art history has 
until recently occupied a prominent place 
among other world’s centres for Byzan-
tine studies, it is encouraging to see it re-
suming its former position.
This year’s conference organized in 
Moscow by the Research Centre for 
Eastern Christian Culture explored some 
of the fundamental phenomena associ-
ated with sacred spaces and their escha-
tological meaning as expressed through 
various ways of creating “new Jerusalems”. 
Seemingly static, these phenomena nev-
ertheless functioned in a variety of ways, 
depending on time, place and interests of 
certain social groups.
Demonstrating convincingly the sig-
niﬁcance of creativity in developing new 
methodological approaches and scholarly 
communication at a global level, the activ-
ity of the Moscow Centre oﬀers a model 
to be followed.
Gábor Ágoston’s book emerged as a re-
sult of inadequate research into the role 
of military power and the weapons in-
dustry in the Ottoman Empire of the 
th–th centuries, an epoch marked 
by a revolution in warfare. This Hun-
garian historian, currently teaching at 
Georgetown University, Washington, of-
fers a historical analysis of the Ottoman 
gunpowder-based weapons industry and, 
drawing from signiﬁcant archive materi-
als, challenges classical stereotypes about 
Islamic conservatism, examining in a sim-
ple and concise manner the contents and 
potentials of Ottoman military power, its 
causes and development, as well as the is-
sue of raw materials necessary for an ef-
fective and competent equipment of the 
Ottoman Army with weapons based on 
gunpowder technology. 
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The main body of text, which includes 
 illustrations,  geographic maps and 
 tables, is divided into seven sections: 
Introduction: Firearms and Armaments 
Industries, Gunpowder Technology and the 
Ottomans, Cannons and Muskets, Saltpe-
tre Industries, Munitions and Ordnance 
Industries, Conclusions: Guns and Empire. 
In addition to an appendix containing  
tables, the book also includes clariﬁca-
tions on weights and measures, the bib-
liography and the index of personal and 
geographical names.
The use of ﬁrearms in European bat-
tles in the s and s, including the 
Balkans, had made the Ottomans rec-
ognize the necessity of equipping their 
army with the required arsenal by the 
end of the century. Adopted as a result of 
pragmatism and real needs, the new tech-
nology proved very eﬃcient in the con-
quest of Constantinople in . In the 
second chapter the author discusses the 
use of ﬁrearms by janissaries, the found-
ing of naval and artillery forces, the role 
of foreigners in technology transfer and 
manufacture, and demonstrates that the 
Ottomans not only adopted gunpowder 
technology but even remained a powerful 
“gunpowder empire” until the th cen-
tury. Resistance to the new weapons and 
changing styles of warfare was not caused 
by some distinctively Islamic mental-
ity, indeed it is readily comparable with 
similar resistances oﬀered by Europe’s 
disappearing feudal world. Some deeper 
socioeconomic and cultural reasons ena-
bled the Empire to retain its military su-
periority over its neighbours until the end 
of the th century.
The third chapter, simply entitled 
Cannons and Muskets, is marked by exem-
plary quantiﬁcative evidence. Following 
his basic idea which rectiﬁes the prevail-
ing opinion, Ágoston analyses diﬀerent 
types of artillery ranging from heavy and 
ineﬃcient cannons to smaller mortars of 
diﬀerent calibres, and compares them to 
the weapons of the Ottoman enemies. 
Smaller cannons such as şayka and baly-
emeyez as well as the smallest ones such 
as şahi, saçma, prang, eynek, misket and 
şakaloz were also used. Heavy artillery ac-
counted for only  percent of the Otto-
man siege force and was mostly used in 
defending signiﬁcant fortiﬁcations such as 
Belgrade. Small arms carried by janissar-
ies, such as riﬂes/muskets, corresponded 
to the standards of Spanish and Venetian 
ﬁrearms. Nevertheless, gunpowder and 
cannon ammunition production seems 
to have been a more signiﬁcant feature of 
the Ottoman military industry than the 
manufacture of small arms.
The next two chapters look at the 
necessary economic basis of the Ottoman 
military industry discussing the supply 
of saltpetre, sulphur and coal, as well as 
gunpowder production. Although it has 
been thought that the Ottomans in many 
ways depended on the import of arma-
ments and new technologies, there is no 
evidence for that in archive materials. 
Many saltpetre plantations demonstrate 
that the Ottoman Empire was able to 
produce enormous amounts. In the Bal-
kans such plantations were at Priština, 
Drama, Melnik, Štip and Kumanovo, but 
Anatolian and Arabian regions were also 
signiﬁcant raw materials bases. But there 
was less sulphur. It was brought from the 
Black Sea area, the Van province, Molda-
via, the island of Melos, and partly from 
the Ohrid area in modern Macedonia. 
Coal was derived from a special “black 
tree” (kaarağaç). After the consideration 
of natural resources and needs, Ágoston 
places them in the context of Ottoman 
Government connections and saltpetre 
production within the taxation system 
known as iltizam. He is interested in the 
issue of government control and security 
mechanisms, frauds and embezzlements, 
labour force, as well as tax and military 
exemptions for the saltpetre-producing 
villages. His special attention is focused 
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on ocaklik or villages situated near saltpe-
tre plantations, forests, gunpowder manu-
factures, mines, fortresses and mountain 
gorges whose inhabitants worked on spe-
ciﬁc tasks in accordance with the inten-
tions of the central government. Relying 
on the original documentary evidence, the 
author stresses that the Ottoman Empire 
was able to produce suﬃcient supplies of 
saltpetre, which was the most important 
ingredient of gunpowder. Even when 
the Empire had to purchase additional 
amounts, for example during the war of 
–, when  of the total amount 
had to be supplied in that way, this did 
not signiﬁcantly aﬀected the Empire’s to-
tal expenses. 
Developed in the gunpowder facto-
ries of Constantinople, Cairo, Baghdad, 
Aleppo, Yemen, Belgrade, and elsewhere, 
gunpowder production would intensify in 
times of war. Examining the infrastruc-
ture of such factories in diﬀerent parts 
of the Empire, their typology, manufac-
turing processes, output and gunpowder 
quality, Ágoston concludes that the Em-
pire was able to satisfy its own needs deep 
into the th century, unlike many Eu-
ropean countries. It was only at the time 
of a Russo-Turkish war in – that a 
shortage of gunpowder aﬀected the Otto-
man army. The second half of that century 
witnessed a signiﬁcant decline in produc-
tion, from – metric tonnes re-
corded in the th century to  metric 
tonnes, making imports unavoidable. As 
a result, Selim III (–) made a 
reorganisation of three main gunpowder 
factories, in Istanbul, Selanik and Geli-
bolu, but the reorganisation did not prove 
eﬀective enough. So a new water-powered 
gunpowder factory was constructed in the 
coastal town of Azadli. By the end of the 
century the factory had reached the an-
nual output of – metric tonnes.
The sixth section of the book analyses 
ore deposits providing ingredients neces-
sary for ammunition and ﬁrearms pro-
duction. Relying on the Ottoman sources 
once again, the author suggests that the 
Empire suﬀered a serious shortage of lo-
cal tin, which was imported from Europe, 
whereas other raw materials such as steel, 
lead and copper were produced in suﬃ-
cient amounts in the Empire. With the 
authentic data at hand, the author makes 
a comparative evaluation of the Ottoman 
weapons. Discussing their size, the chem-
ical components involved and the total 
production, he questions the earlier histo-
riographic views of the Ottoman army as 
“technologically inferior”.
The research done in this book dem-
onstrates that the Ottoman defeats at the 
end of the th century and especially in 
the second half of the th century were 
not the result of technological lags or an 
inadequate productivity of the military 
industry. Their causes should be sought 
for in advantages that European society 
had after the major economic and admin-
istrative reforms of that era. Besides that, 
battles were not won with better weapons 
but with command systems, control and 
training of troops. More developed ways 
of communication and funding prevailed 
although the Ottoman Army won battles 
in the th century including both the 
one against Russia in  and against 
Austria in –. In the second half of 
the th century the Empire was exposed 
to huge ﬁnancial strains, which seriously 
weakened central power. One of the main 
problems was its loose control of gun-
powder production. Janissaries and the 
ulem were against the planned reforms of 
sultan Selim III because they considered 
them aimed against themselves.
In an expert and detailed manner, Gá-
bor Ágoston’s book opens the possibility 
for further research. It is particularly rich 
in data pertinent to the military industry 
and warfare styles in the Balkans. 
